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I. INTRODUCTION 
As a teenager, my vinyl record collection contained such classics as 
the Beach Boys’ “Surfin’ USA” and George Harrison’s “My Sweet 
Lord.”  These and other songs were readily available at the Music Staff, 
a local record store that was one of the most popular hangouts of my 
youth.  Even though both of these songs have been found to infringe the 
musical compositions of “Sweet Little Sixteen”1 and “He’s So Fine,”2 
respectively, my purchase and ownership of albums containing these 
songs never subjected me to copyright-infringement liability.  Indeed, 
when the Chiffons sued George Harrison for copyright infringement in 
the 1970s for plagiarizing their musical composition of “He’s So Fine,”3 
neither party—nor anyone else—would have envisioned that the 
purchasers of Harrison’s All Things Must Pass album,4 which included 
“My Sweet Lord,”5 would be considered infringers merely because they 
obtained a phonorecord6 of the sound recording, even though “My Sweet 
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 1. Chuck Berry Biography, THE ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF FAME AND MUSEUM, 
http://rockhall.com/inductees/chuck-berry/bio/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (discussing Chuck Berry’s 
infringement suit against the Beach Boys). 
 2. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976). 
 3. Id. at 178. 
 4. GEORGE HARRISON, ALL THINGS MUST PASS (Capitol Records 1970). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, sound recordings are fixed in “phonorecords”; other 
works are fixed as “copies.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  “‘Phonorecords’ are material objects in which 
sounds . . . are fixed by any method . . . and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. . . .  [This definition] 
includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.”  Id.  “The term ‘copies’ includes the 
material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.”  Id.; see also London-
Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 165 n.14 (D. Mass. 2008) (“The two terms [copy 
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Lord” was an unauthorized copy and adaptation of the Chiffons’ musical 
composition.  The mere act of purchasing a material copy or a 
phonorecord7 does not infringe any of a copyright owner’s enumerated 
rights under either the Copyright Act of 19098 or the Copyright Act of 
1976 (the 1976 Act).9 
The advent and rapid growth of online music retailers has provided 
musicians new avenues to sell their songs.  Artists can digitally save their 
sound recordings as MP3 files.10  An artist may release these files 
through online stores like iTunes, where consumers may access, pay for, 
and make an authorized copy of a song.11  One expected result of online 
legal music downloading has been its effect on brick-and-mortar record 
stores and CD manufacturers.  In the last five years, many music retailers 
have closed, including Tower Records,12 Sam Goody,13 and a multitude 
                                                                                                                       
and phonorecord] appear to be functionally interchangeable . . . differing only in the nature of the 
copyrighted work.”) (citing H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5666). 
 7. This would also apply to purchases of the musical composition in the form of sheet music or 
fixed as a copy in any other form.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 8. The district court decided Harrisongs in 1976, prior to the January 1, 1978 effective date of 
the Copyright Act of 1976.  420 F. Supp. at 177; see also Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598–99 (1976) (noting effective date of Jan. 1, 1978) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006)).  Under the Copyright Act of 1909, copyright owners had 
the exclusive rights to “print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend” the work; to translate the work into 
other languages or dialects; to publicly perform or display the work; and to produce and distribute 
the work.  Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 superseded by 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006).  A consumer purchasing, receiving, or possessing a copy of a 
copyrighted work does not infringe any of these rights. 
 9. The six enumerated rights of copyright owners under the Copyright Act of 1976 are the 
reproduction right, the adaptation right, the distribution right, the public-display and public-
performance rights, and, for sound recordings, the digital-broadcast right.  17 U.S.C. § 106.  
Purchasing a phonorecord—the physical embodiment of a sound recording—does not fall into any 
of these categories. 
 10. MP3 is one of the dominant audio files types used in downloading.  Musical sounds can be 
turned into a digital form and recorded onto a compact disc (CD). But in the format on CDs, three 
minutes of a sound recording translates to a 30 megabyte file, or 30 million bytes of data, which may 
be too large for downloading.  What Are MP3 Files and How Do They Work?, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/question118.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).  To compress 
that large song file into a smaller format that is more quickly downloaded, the Moving Picture 
Experts Group (MPEG) developed a compression system for sound recordings called MPEG Audio 
Layer-3, or MP3, which “can compress a song by a factor of 10 or 12 and still retain something close 
to CD quality.” Id.  Therefore, that 30-megabyte sound file from a CD reduces to about 3 megabytes 
in MP3 format.  Id. 
 11. See, e.g., iTunes, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2011). 
 12. The Day Music Died? No, but Tower Records Is, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 15, 2006, 9:43 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15251144/ns/business-us_business/. 
 13. Greg Sandoval, More Consolidation Among Major Music Labels? CNET NEWS (Jan. 20, 
2011, 6:54 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20029136-261.html. 
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of smaller music proprietorships.14  Sony has shut down and consolidated 
CD manufacturing facilities.15  In 2009, downloaded music accounted for 
98% of all individual songs sold, and 12% of all albums sold.16 
Recent scholarship has addressed digital-music issues such as peer-
to-peer unauthorized downloading of songs,17 the future of online music 
distribution,18 tactics used by the entertainment industry to curtail 
unauthorized copying,19 and the social acceptability of music sampling.20  
Still, there is a lurking issue yet to be addressed: one unintended 
                                                          
 14. Justin Pope, Record Stores Closing in U.S. at Record Rates, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 30, 
2008, 12:08 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695265521/Record-stores-closing-in-US-at-
record-rates.html. 
 15. William Fenton, Report: Sony Shutting Down CD Manufacturing Plant in N.J., 
PCMAG.COM (Jan. 13, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2375682,00.asp. 
 16. Lexton Snol, Single Track Downloads Dominate, PCWORLD (Jan. 30, 2011, 10:04 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/218172/single_track_downloads_dominate.html.  The overall 
number of albums sold in any form, CD or digital, has declined 7% between 2007 and 2009, while—
thanks to the ability to download individual songs rather than purchase an entire album—the number 
of singles sold has grown 76%.  Id.; see also Caitlin Kenney, Album Sales Hit Record Lows. Again., 
NPR (Aug. 26, 2010 1:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2010/08/25/129428450/album-
sales-hit-record-lows. 
 17. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for 
Resolving Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005) (discussing 
peer-to-peer file sharing and related copyright issues); Chad A. Sanders, Note, Maverick Recording 
Co. v. Whitney Harper: How the Fifth Circuit Virtually Eliminated Innocent Infringers Without 
Noticing, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 295 (2010) (analyzing case dealing with peer-to-peer 
file sharing and copyright infringement). 
 18. See, e.g., Robert J. Delchin, Music Copyright Law: Past, Present and Future of Online 
Music Distribution, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343 (2004) (discussing legal developments in 
online music distribution). 
 19. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010) (discussing 
entertainment industry tactics to address online copyright infringement); Jordana Boag, Comment, 
The Battle of Piracy versus Privacy: How the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) Is 
Using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) As Its Weapon Against Internet Users’ Privacy 
Rights, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 241 (2004) (discussing RIAA counter-piracy efforts); Kate Cross, 
Comment, David v. Goliath: How the Record Industry Is Winning Substantial Judgments Against 
Individuals for Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1031 (2010) (analyzing 
damages in suits brought by the RIAA). 
 20. See, e.g., KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND 
CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011) (discussing the history, licensing, and future of music 
sampling); Mark A. Edwards, Acceptable Deviance and Property Rights, 43 CONN. L. REV. 457 
(2010) (discussing divergences between social acceptability and legality of behavior with regard to 
property rights); Michael J. Madison, Intellectual Property and Americana, or Why IP Gets the 
Blues, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 677, 702–03 (2008) (noting effect of 
intellectual property law on “the arc of . . . blues [music] and its descendants”); David Mongillo, The 
Girl Talk Dilemma: Can Copyright Law Accommodate New Forms of Sample-Based Music?, 9 PITT. 
J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2009) (discussing copyright-infringement issues related to audio sampling); 
Jeffrey Omari, Mix and Mash: The Digital Sampling of Music Has Stretched the Meaning of the Fair 
Use Defense, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 35 (discussing recent developments in music sampling 
disputes). 
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consequence of the ability to sell songs through downloads is a new, and 
yet unnoticed, way to infringe copyrights, which, unless remedied, could 
lead to new classes of defendants never contemplated in the 1976 Act’s 
protections for artists, musicians, and authors. 
Unlike a brick-and-mortar transaction, the act of purchasing a song 
on the web requires that the purchaser “download” a digital file of the 
song—that is, make a copy of the song that is located on the vendor’s 
website and transfer that copy to the consumer’s computer.  Thus, 
downloading copies and phonorecords triggers copyright protections 
every time a consumer purchases and downloads a song from an online 
music retailer.21  The consumer benefits at the expense of one of the 
rights of the copyright owner—the reproduction right.22  Of course, by 
making one’s song available for download, the copyright owner allows 
for such a reproduction. 
But suppose the downloaded song is later the subject of an 
infringement suit regarding the melody or lyrics in the underlying 
musical composition.23  Every time the alleged infringer’s musical 
composition—which is fixed in the digital file of the sound recording—is 
downloaded, the purchaser of the downloaded file has made an 
unauthorized reproduction of an unauthorized adaptation of the 
plaintiff’s musical work.  To borrow from the Harrisongs example, 
George Harrison’s “My Sweet Lord” constituted an unauthorized 
adaptation of the Chiffons’ “He’s So Fine.”24  Thus, a consumer’s 
download of “My Sweet Lord” would be an unauthorized reproduction 
of an unauthorized adaptation of “He’s So Fine.” 
While the Chiffons and Harrison resolved their litigation decades 
ago—leaving purchasers of “My Sweet Lord” safe from liability—rapper 
Biz Markie faced an infringement suit in the 1990s25 and rapper 50 Cent 
was recently sued for allegedly taking another artist’s instrumental.26
                                                          
 21. Because downloading music, videos, or movies from a peer-to-peer network creates an 
unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work, the downloading party may incur copyright-
infringement liability.  See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001) (detailing logistics of peer-to-peer file sharing). 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). 
 23. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“A 
copier will be liable for copying the musical work in its entirety, that is, the composition’s words and 
music together, as well as for copying just the music or the words alone.” (citing PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT § 2.8 (2d ed. 1996))). 
 24. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
 26. Rich Jones, 50 Cent Sued for Copyright Infringement Over “I Get Money”, ASSOCIATED 
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This may expose online purchasers of both rappers’ works to 
infringement liability.27 
In 1991, Biz Markie was found to have infringed Gilbert 
O’Sullivan’s musical composition, “Alone Again (Naturally).”28  Markie 
admitted to sampling a portion of O’Sullivan’s work for use in his song 
“Alone Again.”29  O’Sullivan ultimately enjoined Markie’s use of the 
sampling.30  The district court rejected the defendants’ argument that the 
pervasiveness of music sampling in the rap industry should excuse the 
infringement.31 
In the case of 50 Cent,32 his song “I Get Money” is currently the 
subject of dispute in litigation with Caliber, another rap artist.33  Caliber 
claims that the instrumental in 50 Cent’s song infringes Caliber’s 
copyright ownership of the track.34  “I Get Money” went double 
platinum,35 selling over two million copies as either a single or as a track 
on the album Curtis.36  Even if only half of those purchases were 
downloads, that translates to one million consumers infringing Caliber’s 
reproduction right.  The combined statutory damages that Caliber could 
                                                                                                                       
CONTENT FROM YAHOO! (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/6162288/50_ 
cent_sued_for_copyright_infringement.html?cat=33. 
 27. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion. 
 28. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185. 
 29. Id. at 183 (“Defendants admit ‘that the Biz Markie album “I Need A Haircut” embodies the 
rap recording “Alone Again” which uses three words from “Alone Again (Naturally)” composed by 
Gilbert O’Sullivan and a portion of the music taken from the O’Sullivan recording.’”).  For an 
explanation of sampling see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 886 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (explaining that “[s]ampling, common in rap, hip-hop, and urban music, typically 
involves making a digital copy from a master sound recording and using a piece in the making of a 
new work”).  For a detailed discussion of the legal issues involved in sampling, see Carlos Ruiz de la 
Torre, Digital Music Sampling and Copyright Law: Can the Interests of Copyright Owners and 
Sampling Artists Be Recorded?, 7 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 401 (2005); Stephen R. Wilson, Music 
Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De Minimis Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. 
L. 179 (2002). 
 30. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185. 
 31. Id. at 183 (“[T]he defendants in this action . . . would have this court believe that stealing is 
rampant in the music business and, for that reason, their conduct here should be excused.  The 
conduct of the defendants herein, however, violates not only the Seventh Commandment, but also 
the copyright laws of this country.”). 
 32. 50 Cent is the performing name of Curtis James Jackson III.  50 Cent, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/50_Cent (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). 
 33. Jones, supra note 26. 
 34. Id. 
 35. I Get Money, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Get_Money (last visited Feb. 1, 
2011). 
 36. See Certification Criteria, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS’N OF AM., http://www.riaa.com/ 
goldandplatinum.php?content_selector=criteria (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
LIEBESMAN FINAL 11/14/2011  8:09 PM 
6 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
 
collect would range between $750 million and $30 billion.37  It may only 
be a matter of time before the copyright holders of musical compositions 
sue consumers over downloads of songs that are the subject of 
infringement suits. 
Through the Internet, copyright infringement has taken on new 
dimensions never foreseen by the legislators who enacted the 1976 Act.  
In an effort to address this overlooked area of potential liability, this 
Article urges legislative action.  Rather than waiting for the courts to find 
a downstream defendant liable under such circumstances,38 Congress 
should shield innocent consumers from liability for statutory damages for 
purchasing copies of songs they thought they were legally allowed to 
own. 
This Article approaches this dilemma by first describing the state of 
“traditional” copyright infringement in the brick-and-mortar world in 
Part II.  Part III details how copyright infringement on the Internet 
diverges from the traditional mode based on the difference in how the 
work is fixed and purchased.  It also illustrates how downstream 
infringement by the consumer occurs through the downloading of an 
infringing song from a legitimate music retailer—an act that is several 
steps removed from the original infringement by the defendant-
musician.39  This section then discusses the effects of these internet 
                                                          
 37. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).  The Statutory Damages provision of the 1976 Act states that: 
[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an 
award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to 
any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually . . . in a sum of not less 
than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just. 
Id.  Engaging in some simple math shows that if one million music lovers downloaded an infringing 
song, such as “I Get Money,” then the plaintiff—in this instance, Caliber—could receive anywhere 
between $750 million and $30 billion if he was able to collect from every person who infringed.  
There is, however, some relief for the “innocent” infringer: 
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such 
infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory 
damages to a sum of not less than $200. 
Id. § 504(c)(2).  If every consumer defended herself in court and met this burden, Caliber would 
collect a minimum of $200 million.  See infra Parts III and IV for further discussion on innocent 
infringers and a proposed modification of this section of the statute. 
 38. Alternatively, courts could find that consumers are not subject to liability—even though 
copyright infringement is a tort of strict liability—under the 1976 Act.  See infra Part III. 
 39. If one considers the original act of infringement to be the creation of the unauthorized 
derivative work by the defendant composer or musician, then the sound recording of that infringing 
work would be one step removed; distributing the sound recording to online music retailers would be 
two steps removed from the original infringing activity.  The distribution by the online retailer would 
be three steps away, and, finally, the purchase and download by the consumer would be four steps 
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purchases on a class of third-party infringers: those musician-defendants 
who create infringing works and provide sound recordings for download.  
Part IV addresses public policy that supports reducing the liability of 
downstream copyright infringers and foretells some ramifications of 
allowing these suits to proceed.  Part V then proposes solutions to shield 
consumers from downstream-infringement liability.  This Article 
concludes with final thoughts on the necessity of ensuring that 
consumers are not caught in the legitimate web of composers protecting 
their musical compositions, and how allowing infringement actions 
against unforeseen downstream defendants can affect overall fidelity to 
the rule of law. 
II. BUYING THAT INFRINGING CD AT THE SWAP MEET 
In order to frame the discussion on why consumers who are 
downstream from the infringing activity should not be held liable for the 
actions of upstream infringing musicians, some historical context proves 
useful.  Prior to the advent of music downloading from the Internet, one 
could only obtain an authorized phonorecord of a sound recording by 
visiting a brick-and-mortar store or other retailer40 and purchasing the 
material object—such as a vinyl record, cassette, eight-track tape, or 
CD—in which the sound recording was “fixed.”  Through this world 
view, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976.  This section, 
therefore, first explores the liabilities faced by a consumer who legally 
purchases a material object that embodies an infringing musical 
composition. 
A. Civil Liability Under the Copyright Act 
Going to a store and purchasing a CD containing either an authorized 
or unauthorized phonorecord does not involve any of the enumerated 
rights under § 106 of the Copyright Act.41  The consumer has not copied 
the musical composition or sound recording and fixed that copy in a 
tangible medium of expression.  She has not distributed a material object 
containing the copyrighted work, and she has not made an adaptation of 
                                                                                                                       
downstream from the original infringing act. 
 40. As a young woman, I also frequently purchased music at “swap meets,” flea markets, and 
garage sales.  While some of these venues probably sold pirated music, most also sold a large 
quantity of new and used authorized phonorecords. 
 41. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
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or publicly broadcast the songs contained on the CD.  Even if the seller 
of the CD infringes one of these rights, the purchaser does not.  Thus, in 
the brick-and-mortar world, consumers do not infringe a copyright 
owner’s rights when they purchase a material object, even if it embodies 
an unauthorized copy or phonorecord. 42 
A brick-and-mortar sale of the infringing 50 Cent CD infringes the 
distribution rights of Caliber and subjects the retailer to strict liability.43  
And the musician who wrote and recorded the infringing song may also 
incur liability for (1) vicarious or (2) contributory infringement based on 
the actions of the retailer. 
To prove vicarious liability, a plaintiff must show that the defendant 
“has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has 
a direct financial interest in such activities.”44  No knowledge of the 
infringing activity is required.45  The musician who has recorded an 
infringing song and distributes it—either directly or through a record 
label—has both actual control over the sale of those phonorecords and a 
definite financial interest in their sale. 
To be held liable for contributory infringement, two elements must 
be proven: (1) that a defendant has “knowledge of the infringing 
activity”; and (2) that the defendant “induces, causes or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”46  Again, in addition to 
facing direct liability, the musician who wrote and recorded the 
                                                          
 42. See id. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner 
as provided by sections 106 through 122 . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as 
the case may be.”), invalidated in part by Nat. Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents, 633 
F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011) (declaring § 501(a) unconstitutional to the extent it conflicts with state 
sovereign immunity). 
 43. See id. § 106(3) (giving the owner of a copyright the exclusive right to authorize 
distribution of copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale).  Suits of this 
nature are not unprecedented; in the 1980s, several small music retail stores were sued for 
distributing unauthorized copies of CDs.  See generally Stan Soocher, He’s The No. 1 Bane of 
Pirates: CD Copies Worry the Music Business, NAT’L L.J., June 19, 1989, at 2. 
 44. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971) (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); Case 
Note, Television Sponsor and Advertising Agency Held Vicariously Liable for Copyright 
Infringement—Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 64 MICH. L. REV. 1172, 1175–78 (1966)); 
see also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 45. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 307 (“When the right and ability to supervise 
coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials—
even in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired—the 
purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary 
of that exploitation.” (citation omitted) (citing De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944))). 
 46. Gershwin Publ’g, 443 F.2d at 1162 (footnote omitted) (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United 
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)). 
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infringing song could incur third-party liability on the theory of 
contributory infringement.  The infringer-musician has knowledge of the 
music store’s distribution of the infringing phonorecord and materially 
contributes by providing the phonorecord for sale in the record store. 
The infringing musician may also face a claim of inducing copyright 
infringement; however, “the standard for inducement liability is 
providing a service ‘with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright.’  ‘[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or actual 
infringing uses would not be enough here to subject [a defendant] to 
liability.’”47  A musician’s liability for inducing the record store to 
infringe on the copyright owner’s distribution right will depend on 
proving that the musician took “‘active steps . . . to encourage direct 
infringement,’ such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to 
engage in an infringing use.”48  This may be difficult to prove—the 
musician’s goals are to create music and make money, not to induce 
record stores to infringe.49 
B. Criminal Liability 
Currently, federal prosecutors target primarily manufacturers, 
distributors, and transporters50 of bootlegged51 and pirated52 goods.  
Prosecutors have attempted to use the National Stolen Property Act,53 
                                                          
 47. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 801 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913, 936–37 (2005)). 
 48. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (citation omitted) (quoting Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. 
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).  “[A] showing that infringement was encouraged 
overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product 
suitable for some lawful use.”  Id. 
 49. For a finding of inducement, there would have to be “evidence of express promotion, 
marketing, and intent to promote further, [and] the business models employed by” the musician 
would have to show that her principal object for providing the sound recordings to record stores was 
for the purposes of infringing on the plaintiff’s musical work.  Id. at 926. 
 50. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006). 
 51. According to the Supreme Court, “[a] ‘bootleg’ phonorecord is one which contains an 
unauthorized copy of a commercially unreleased performance.”  Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 
207, 209 n.2 (1985). 
 52. A “pirated” phonorecord refers to “an unauthorized copy of a performance already 
commercially released,” id., “but with new packaging.”  Soocher, supra note 43, at 2.  A 
“counterfeit” is a “duplication of not only previously released sound recordings, but [of] also the 
original packaging.”  Id. at 2.  As noted by the Court in Dowling, the terms “bootleg” and “pirated” 
are often used interchangeably.  473 U.S. at 209 n.2. 
 53. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 208. 
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which criminalizes the interstate transportation of stolen property, to 
target transporters of bootlegged, pirated, and counterfeit goods.54  The 
Supreme Court, however, held that the transportation of bootleg 
phonorecords did not fall within the reach of § 2314’s definition of 
“stolen goods.”55 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, declared that 
“interference with copyright does not . . . equate with theft, conversion, 
or fraud.  The [1976 Act] even employs a separate term of art to define 
one who misappropriates a copyright.”56  The Court elaborated on the 
difference between theft or conversion of a physical object and 
infringement of a copyright: 
The infringer invades a statutorily defined province guaranteed to the 
copyright holder alone. But he does not assume physical control over 
the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its owner of its use. While 
one may colloquially liken infringement with some general notion of 
wrongful appropriation, infringement plainly implicates a more 
complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, 
conversion, or fraud.57 
Today, a transporter of bootleg phonorecords could face prosecution 
under the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982.58  There 
is, however, no criminal liability for the purchasers of unauthorized 
copies or phonorecords.  Section 506(a) provides that: 
Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be punished as 
provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement was 
committed— 
                                                          
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006).  For further discussion regarding the growth of unauthorized 
sound recordings, see David Schwartz, Note, Strange Fixation: Bootleg Sound Recordings Enjoy the 
Benefits of Improving Technology, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 611 (1995). 
 55. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216. 
 56. Id. at 217. 
 57. Id. at 217–18.  State courts have also found that statutes criminalizing the possession of 
stolen property do not encompass the possession of materials that contain infringing works.  See, 
e.g., People v. Borriello, 587 N.Y.S.2d 518, 522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1992) (noting that under the 
alternative view “a person who purchases a duplicate of a ‘Gucci’ or ‘Dior’ or some other designer 
item, which the person has reason to believe is unauthorized, would commit the crime of possessing 
stolen property”). 
 58. Pub. L. No 97-180, 96 Stat. 91, 93 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006)).  The 
Supreme Court noted that the government conceded this point in its opposition of Dowling’s petition 
for a writ of certiorari by “acknowledg[ing] that it no longer need[ed] § 2314 to prosecute and 
punish serious copyright infringement” and could instead rely on this new statute.  Dowling, 473 
U.S. at 228 n.21. 
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(A) for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; 
(B) by the reproduction or distribution .  .  .  of 1 or more copies or 
phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail 
value of more than $1,000; or 
(C) by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial 
distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible  
to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the 
work was intended for commercial distribution.59 
Other provisions in the federal criminal code similarly punish traffickers 
and those who make unauthorized fixations or distributions, but not those 
who receive the goods.60 
III. MUSIC IN THE INTERNET ERA 
The 1998 launch of the website Ritmoteca.com revolutionized the 
acquisition of sound recordings by consumers.61  No longer were 
consumers limited to the selection at the local record shop; the universe 
of available genres became almost infinite.  Online music stores have 
made it easier for consumers to purchase music from both well-known 
and obscure artists; new and unknown bands now have the ability to find 
an audience for their music. 
In a brick-and-mortar transaction, a consumer does not make a copy 
when she buys a song; rather, she purchases a material object which 
embodies a phonorecord of the copyrighted work.  Internet stores such as 
                                                          
 59. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (emphasis added). 
 60. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006) (providing criminal sanctions for violations of 17 U.S.C. § 
506); id. § 2319A (criminalizing the unauthorized fixation, transmission, and distribution of sound 
recordings and music videos of live musical performances); id. § 2319B (criminalizing the 
“[u]nauthorized recording of Motion pictures in a Motion picture exhibition facility” (emphasis 
added)); id. § 2320 (criminalizing “[t]rafficking in counterfeit goods or services” (emphasis added)).  
For the most part, states are preempted from enacting similar laws.  See, e.g., People v. Williams, 
920 N.E.2d 446, 457 (Ill. 2009) (holding that the Illinois criminal statute regarding piracy of sound 
recordings was preempted by the Federal Copyright Act).  Several states have managed to enact 
similar statutes that have survived preemption challenges.  See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 286 Cal. 
Rptr. 734, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a statute criminalizing the advertising, offering, or 
possessing for sale of pirated recordings or audiovisual works is not preempted by federal law).  But 
none of these address the unknowing purchase or possession of unauthorized copies or 
phonorecords.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653w (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-60 (West 
2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21 (West 2005). 
 61. Ritmoteca.com is credited with being one of the first online music stores.  Online Music 
Store, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_music_store (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
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iTunes, CD Universe, and Amazon.com work differently—they sell 
songs via downloads.  “A download is a transmission of an electronic file 
containing a digital copy of a musical work62 that is sent from an on-line 
server to a local hard drive.”63  Under the Copyright Act, this 
downloaded electronic file is considered a material object.64  “The 
Copyright Act . . . does not use materiality in its most obvious sense—to 
mean a tangible object with a certain heft, like a book or compact disc.  
Rather, it refers to materiality as a medium in which a copyrighted work 
can be ‘fixed.’”65 
Thus, any object in which a sound recording can be fixed is a “material 
object.”  That includes . . . electronic files . . . .  [For example, w]hen a 
user on a peer-to-peer network downloads a song from another user, he 
receives into his computer a digital sequence representing the sound 
recording.  That sequence is magnetically encoded on a segment of his 
hard disk (or likewise written on other media.)  With the right hardware 
and software, the downloader can use the magnetic sequence to 
reproduce the sound recording.  The electronic file (or, perhaps more 
accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard disk) is therefore a 
“phonorecord” within the meaning of the [1976 Act].66 
Thus, “the delivery of a music file to a purchaser via a download 
constitutes a mechanical reproduction of the copyrighted work in the  
 
                                                          
 62. Under the 1976 Act, musical works are copyrightable subject matter.  17 U.S.C. § 
102(a)(2); see also Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“It is well-established that ‘musical works, including any accompanying words,’ may be 
copyrighted under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).”). 
 63. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 
2010) (citing United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 
411 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
 64. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 170–71 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 65. Id. at 171 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).  The Copyright Act provides that “‘[a] work is “fixed” 
in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, . . . is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration.’”  17 U.S.C. § 101.  “The sole purpose of the term 
‘material object’ is to provide a reference point for the terms ‘phonorecords’ and ‘fixed.’”  London-
Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 171. 
 66. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101); accord Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 
693, 703–04 (2d Cir. 1998); Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); WORKING GRP. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 213 (1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/ 
doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf (noting that electronic transmissions implicate copyright holders’ rights and 
strongly implying that electronic files constitute “material objects”). 
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form of a ‘digital phonorecord delivery’ as set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 
115(d).”67 
Purchasing a song online requires an authorized copying of that song 
from the music store’s website or server onto the customer’s computer.68  
A consumer could reasonably assume that the songs on the legitimate 
online music store available for purchase are there with the permission of 
the copyright owners and that any copying done in conjunction with the 
transaction is an authorized reproduction—that is, upon payment, the 
consumer has the permission of the copyright owner to create and 
download a copy.69 
A. Consumers as Downstream Infringers 
Suppose, however, the purchased song is infringing on another 
musical composition.  Since copyright infringement is a tort of strict 
liability, “a plaintiff need not prove wrongful intent or culpability in 
order to prevail . . . .  Even an innocent copier—for example, one who 
copies in the belief that the infringed work is in the public domain or 
without realizing that he or she is copying—is liable . . . .”70  It does not 
                                                          
 67. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 447; see also 17 U.S.C. 
§ 115(c)(3)(G)(i) (“A digital phonorecord delivery of a sound recording is actionable as an act of 
infringement . . . unless (I) the digital phonorecord delivery has been authorized by the copyright 
owner of the sound recording, and (II) . . . has otherwise been authorized by the copyright owner of 
the musical work to distribute or authorize the distribution, by means of a digital phonorecord 
delivery, of each musical work embodied in the sound recording.”). 
 68. See Stenograph, 144 F.3d at 100 (“The language of the Copyright Act, case law, and 
common sense support the proposition that the installation of software onto a computer results in 
‘copying’ within the meaning of the [1976 Act].” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101; 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08[A][1], at 8-113 (1997))); Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he act of loading a program from a medium of 
storage into a computer’s memory creates a copy of the program.”). 
 69. Even without express permission, the downloading could be interpreted to be a § 117(a)(1) 
exception.  See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an 
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of 
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided that such a new copy or adaptation is 
created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine 
and that it is used in no other manner.”). 
 70. Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  Intent 
does, however, play a role in determining remedies: 
[L]ack of culpability may bear on statutory damages where those are in issue. . . .  In 
consequence, there is no proper role for proof of wilfulness [regarding liability].  Its only 
function would be in service of an attempt by plaintiff to prejudice the jury’s assessment 
of damages and, if it proves to be in issue, liability by portraying defendants in an 
unflattering light. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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matter even if the “innocent” copier had obtained an explicit warrant that 
use of the material would not infringe anyone’s rights.71  Thus, under this 
strict liability standard, even these “innocent” downstream infringers—
that is, those who are unaware that they are downloading an unauthorized 
copy of a song—are liable for infringement.  One might think that the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) would not pursue 
these claims.  They are not, however, above suing twelve-year-old girls72 
or the deceased.73   
For “innocent” infringers who can prove a good-faith belief that they 
were not infringing, there is a reduction in statutory damages: 
In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and 
the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to 
believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the 
court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a 
sum of not less than $200.74 
This relief, however, was not designed to limit the damages to 
downstream consumer infringers—rather, it was designed to help 
publishers and broadcasters who printed, distributed, or publicly 
performed a work under the mistaken assumption that they had 
permission to do so.75  The legislative history shows that Congress 
recognized infringement liability’s potential to stifle the public’s access 
to creative works.76  Thus, Congress sought to encourage publishers and 
                                                          
 71. See Bryant v. Europadisk, Ltd., No. 07 Civ 3050(WGY), 2009 WL 1059777, at *5–6 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2009); see also De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 72. 12-Year-Old Settles Music Swap Lawsuit, CNN (Feb. 18, 2004), http://articles.cnn.com/ 
2003-09-09/tech/music.swap.settlement_1_riaa-cary-sherman-kazaa?_s=PM:TECH. 
 73. Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, REGISTER (Feb. 5, 2005, 2:30 AM) 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa_sues_the_dead/. 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
 75. S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 145 (1975). 
The “innocent infringer” provision of section 504(c)(2) has been the subject of extensive 
discussion.  The exception, which would allow reduction of minimum statutory damages 
to $100[, which has since been  raised to $200,] where the infringer “was not aware and 
had no reason to believe that his acts constituted an infringement of copyright,” is 
sufficient to protect against unwarranted liability in cases of occasional or isolated 
innocent infringement, and it offers adequate insulation to users, such as broadcasters and 
newspaper publishers, who are particularly vulnerable to this type of infringement suit.  
On the other hand, by establishing a realistic floor for liability, the provision preserves its 
intended deterrent effect; and it would not allow a defendant to escape simply because the 
plaintiff failed to disprove his claim of innocence. 
Id. 
 76. Id. 
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broadcasters to take chances on new works by withholding any undue 
punishment from the 1976 Act. 
Downstream infringement of this nature casts a wide net.  Millions 
of customers could incur liability because they purchased and 
downloaded a song whose musical composition infringed on another’s 
work.  For example, suppose Caliber wins his infringement lawsuit 
against 50 Cent.  Caliber would then have claims against both retail 
outlets—brick-and-mortar and online—for unauthorized distribution of 
an unauthorized adaptation of Caliber’s song77 and every consumer who 
purchased a download of the song through the online retailers for 
unauthorized reproduction.78 
Individually suing every consumer who downloaded “I Get Money” 
would be onerous; the song sold over two million copies.79  With such a 
multitude of defendants for a single song, a copyright owner such as 
Caliber might seek to certify all of the purchasers of an infringing song 
as a defendant class.80  A defendant class action occurs when a plaintiff 
“name[s] a defendant representative to defend the interests of a class of 
unnamed potential defendants.”81  While rare, suits involving class-
action defendants have been certified.82 
                                                          
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
 78. Id. § 106(1). 
 79. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 80. A “class action” suit is one 
in which the court authorizes a single person or a small group of people to represent the 
interests of a larger group; [specifically, it is] a lawsuit in which the convenience either of 
the public or of the interested parties requires that the case be settled through litigation by 
or against only a part of the group of similarly situated persons and in which a person 
whose interests are or may be affected does not have an opportunity to protect his or her 
interests by appearing personally or through a personally selected representative, or 
through a person specially appointed to act as a trustee or guardian. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (9th ed. 2009). 
 81. James M. Underwood, Road to Nowhere or Jurisprudential U-Turn? The Intersection of 
Punitive Damage Class Actions and the Due Process Clause, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763, 780 
n.96 (2009) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)).  This form of class action has its origins in English 
Chancery courts’ bills of peace “where a plaintiff sued several defendants as a class.” Nelson 
Rodrigues Netto, The Optimal Law Enforcement with Mandatory Defendant Class Action 33 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 59, 77 (2007).  A bill of peace “could resolve a controversy between an individual, 
the adversary, and several persons (called the multitude), where there were common questions of law 
or fact, or both, involving each and every one of them, and where there was no basis for a party 
joinder under the common law.”  Id. at 77 n.55. 
 82. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 610 (1989) (noting certification of case as 
a defendant class action); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4 n.1 (1979) 
(noting the district court’s certification of the case) (citing 400 F. Supp. 737, 741 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975)); In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 354 F.3d 1246, 1264 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming certification 
of case as a defendant class action). 
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A copyright owner such as Caliber would have to meet the 
requirements of Rule 23 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which provides: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all members only if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of 
the claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.83 
In addition, Rule 23(b) specifies the types of class actions that “may be 
maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied.”84 
If Caliber were to file a suit against a class of defendants, a court 
may, in fact, certify the class.85  First, the class could have over one 
million members; therefore, joinder of all members would be 
impracticable.  Second, the questions of law or fact are common to all 
the members of the class—all class members downloaded a song from a 
music retailer’s website.  Third, the questions of law or fact—
infringement based on downloading an infringing song—are common to 
the class, as are the claims or defenses of the representative parties.  The 
prong that creates the most difficulty for Caliber is the requirement that 
those individuals whom he chooses to be “the representative parties 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”86  Caliber would 
                                                          
 83. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (emphasis added); see also Labrador v. Seattle Mortg. Co., No. 08-
2270 SC, 2010 WL 3768378, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2010) (setting out legal standard for class 
certification). 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 85. A court would most likely certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3), which allows class-action 
certification when “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 
A Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class may also be appropriate, however, where individual actions may 
cause “inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would 
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.” 
 86. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
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also have to contend with the notice requirements;87 this may be 
achieved, however, by subpoenaing the online music retailer’s records,  
which should contain the names and addresses of customers who purchased 
the song. 
The class members who do not opt out would be represented by the 
class counsel,88 who would likely claim “innocent infringement,” which, 
if successful, could reduce statutory damages from $750 per defendant to 
$200 each.89  It is unlikely that a single defendant would hire an attorney 
to have her damages reduced by $550; therefore, class certification may 
be in the best interest of the defendants in terms of reducing their 
monetary liability.90 
Should Caliber succeed in his class action suit, he would need to 
collect the statutory damages from all of the members of defendant class.  
Caliber has already acquired the names and addresses of all those 
persons who purchased and downloaded the infringing song for the 
purposes of serving notice.  After a court enters judgment in favor of 
Caliber, he could probably seek a court order directing the online retailer 
to charge the statutory damages to the defendant class members’ credit 
cards.  It is unclear whether this would be successful. 
Large record producers may be hesitant to alienate their customers 
by filing infringement actions against them.  But an individual musician 
could see such an action as his “meal ticket.”  The musician may never 
have a hit song himself, but could “hit the lottery” by suing the one 
million customers who downloaded a hit song that had infringed his 
copyright. 
B. Musicians as Inducers? 
A musician who has created an infringing musical work and made a 
sound recording of that work available for download might also face 
third-party-infringement liability through the doctrines of vicarious 
                                                          
 87. If a court were to certify under Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2), then “the court may direct 
appropriate notice to the class.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).  For a class certification under Rule 
23(b)(3), “the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort.”  Since Caliber would likely subpoena the contact information from the online retailer, 
individual notice to all members would be possible. 
 88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
 89. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). 
 90. If Caliber were to certify one million defendants in the class, then the court could reduce the 
damages from $750 million to $200 million. 
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liability, contributory infringement, and inducement.91  Of course, a 
direct infringement must precede an indirect infringement—in the 
situation at hand, this is the consumer who downloads the infringing 
song.  In our example, 50 Cent may not only have direct-infringement 
liability, but the distribution by the online retailers and downloading of  
his song by customers—both of whom are direct infringers—may subject 
him to third-party liability. 
To prove vicarious liability, Caliber would need to show that 50 Cent 
“ha[d] the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also 
ha[d] a direct financial interest in such activities.”92  50 Cent had the 
right and ability to stop the infringing activity by removing his song from 
the retail websites.  And he had a financial interest in the infringing 
activity—he stands to profit from every online sale and download of the 
infringing song. 
50 Cent may also be liable for contributory infringement if, “with 
knowledge of the infringing activity, [he] induce[d], cause[d,] or 
materially contribute[d] to the infringing conduct of another.”93  50 Cent 
would know about the infringing activity—downloading the songs—
because he is aware that the songs are available for sale online.  After all, 
he—or his agents—negotiated with the online retailer for the song’s 
presence on the website for sale and download.  By this same reasoning, 
50 Cent would also have materially contributed to the consumers’ 
infringing conduct.  In fact, it was his purpose to have the song 
purchased by the general public, even if he did not consider such 
purchases to be infringing activities.  On the other hand, Caliber would 
face some difficulty proving that 50 Cent induced customers to infringe 
Caliber’s copyright, no different from his attempts to show that 50 Cent 
induced a brick-and-mortar record store to infringe.94 
Just like a brick-and-mortar store, an online music retailer, such as 
iTunes or Amazon.com, would face infringement liability as the 
                                                          
 91. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text. 
 92. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971) (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963); Case Note, 
Television Sponsor and Advertising Agency Held Vicariously Liable for Copyright Infringement—
Davis v. E. I. DuPont de NeMours & Co., 64 MICH. L. REV. 1172, 1175–78 (1966)); see also 
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gershwin Publ’g, 
443 F.2d at 1162). 
 93. Gershwin Publ’g, 443 F.2d at 1162 (footnote omitted) (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United 
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396–97 (1968)). 
 94. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
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distributors of an infringing musical work.95  One could argue that the 
sale by the online music retailer and the purchase and download by the 
consumer is one act of infringement; however, these could also be 
considered two separate acts of infringement.  The 1976 Act provides: 
[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual 
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all 
infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for 
which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or 
more infringers are liable jointly and severally . . . .96 
Therefore, if the act of purchasing and downloading the song from an 
online music retailer comprises a single infringement, then the consumer 
and the retailer would incur joint and several liability; the plaintiff 
musician would not be able to collect from both defendants.97  If, 
however, the distribution by the online music retailer and the copying by 
the customer constitute two separate acts of infringement, then the 
plaintiff musician could collect separately from each defendant. 
Unlike a brick-and-mortar store, however, an online music retailer 
may seek protection under the safe-harbor provision in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which would provide immunity  
 
                                                          
 95. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 96. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006); see also U.S. Media Corp. v. Edde Entm’t Corp., No. 94 CIV. 
4849(MBM)MHD, 1998 WL 401532, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1998).  “If several defendants 
participate in a transaction or series of transactions that brings about [a copyright] infringement, they 
will be held jointly and severally liable for plaintiff’s lost profits.”  U.S. Media, 1998 WL 401532, at 
*8 (citing Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467, 472 (2d Cir. 1985); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 
677 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1981)).  However, the defendants in U.S. Media were suppliers, 
distributors, and retailers of a single infringing product—there were no defendant consumers.  Id. at 
*1.  Cf. Bouchat v. Champion Prods., Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 537, 553 (D. Md. 2003) (holding that a 
plaintiff would be entitled to a single statutory damages award for which the primary infringer would 
be jointly and severally liable with derivative infringers). 
 97. Under the tort theory of joint and several liability, “each liable party is individually 
responsible for the entire obligation, but a paying party may have a right of contribution and 
indemnity from nonpaying parties.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (9th ed. 2009).  See also 
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220–21 (1994) (“Joint and several liability applies 
when there has been a judgment against multiple defendants.  It can result in one defendant’s paying 
more than its apportioned share of liability when the plaintiff’s recovery from other defendants is 
limited by factors beyond the plaintiff’s control, such as a defendant’s insolvency.  When the 
limitations on the plaintiff’s recovery arise from outside forces, joint and several liability makes the 
other defendants, rather than an innocent plaintiff, responsible for the shortfall”  (citing Edmonds v. 
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 271–71 (1979))). 
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from monetary liability.98  But this would most likely fail because of the 
inapplicability of several requisite conditions. 
First, an online music retailer would have to qualify as a “service 
provider”99 by showing it is “a provider of online services or network 
access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”100  The online music retailer 
likely falls under the category of “a provider of online services,” thus 
meeting the definition. 
Section 512(c) provides the most plausible safe harbor for an online 
music retailer, limiting liability for service providers with “[i]nformation 
residing on systems or networks at direction of users.”101  Per subsection 
(c)(1), “[a] service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief . . . for 
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a 
user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or 
operated by or for the service provider” if certain conditions are met.  
The service provider—in this instance, the online music retailer—cannot 
“have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material 
on the system or network is infringing.”102  One must first identify the 
“infringing activity”—options include the unauthorized adaptation of a 
musical composition or the unauthorized distribution of the unauthorized 
adaptation of the musical composition.  Obviously, an online music 
retailer would argue that it is the former, and a plaintiff would argue that 
it is the latter.103  The online music retailer and the musician likely 
agreed, however, that the retailer would store the digital file of the sound 
recording on its server, enable customers to purchase copies of the digital 
file for downloading, and receive a percentage of the sales.  The website 
is not merely an enabler or a repository of files.  Additionally, it 
voluntarily enters into agreements with musicians whereby it will 
distribute phonorecords of sound recordings; thus, it infringes the  
 
                                                          
 98. Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2877–86 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006)). 
 99. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. § 512(c).  Section 512(a) applies to “[t]ransitory digital network communications”; § 
512(b) creates immunity for system caching; and § 512(d) provides a safe harbor for search engines.  
None of these applies in this example. 
 102. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 103. If the infringing activity is determined to be merely the unauthorized adaptation, then the 
online music retailer is not a direct infringer and is eligible for the safe harbor.  If, however, the 
infringing activity is the unauthorized distribution, then the online music retailer is a direct infringer 
and thus ineligible for the safe harbor. 
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copyright.  Finally, the music retailer selects the material appearing on its 
website.104 
The safe-harbor provision further requires that the provider of online 
services “d[id] not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider ha[d] the right 
and ability to control such activity.”105  An online music retailer would 
fail this requirement as well.  The retailer profits off the download and 
has the ability to control the infringing activity—that is, the retailer has  
the ability to remove the infringing song file from its website and not make 
it available for download.106 
Therefore, the fact that an online music store actively chooses the 
material it sells and reaps a direct financial benefit from the sale of the 
MP3 files may remove any hope of a safe harbor.  It incurs the same 
liability a brick-and-mortar store incurs; indeed, Apple has already faced 
lawsuits for this form of infringement.107  As for a musician’s vicarious 
liability due to the actions of the online music store, it is also the same as 
it would be in the brick-and-mortar situation discussed previously.108 
IV. HOW FAR DOWNSTREAM DO WE LOOK FOR INFRINGERS? 
Public policy discourages liability for downstream infringement.  In 
several instances, Congress has specifically created statutory exemptions 
for infringing uses by end-users of patented technology.  For example, if 
a medical practitioner performs a medical activity—such as a patented 
surgical technique—that constitutes an infringement under the Patent 
Act, neither the “infringing” medical practitioner nor the hospital or 
facility that accommodated the surgery will face the provisions imposing 
the remedies, injunctions, damages, and attorney’s fees.109 
Downstream liability in patent law has also required notice of the 
patent.  “[W]here a patent is sold as a commercial product, an alleged 
infringer is deemed to have ‘constructive notice’ of the patent protection 
                                                          
 104. See, e.g., Ethan Smith, Apple Finally Shares Beatles, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2010, at B1 
(noting Apple’s success in obtaining the rights to sell the Beatles’ catalog on iTunes). 
 105. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
 106. The final requirement, contained in § 512(c)(1)(C), is also immaterial to our discussion as it 
deals with the “service provider’s” response upon notification of infringing activity. 
 107. Tuan Nguyen, Apple Sued for Artistic Copyright Infringement, DAILYTECH (July 5, 2007, 
4:10 PM), http://www.dailytech.com/Apple+Sued+for+Artistic+Copyright+Infringement/article 
7933.htm. 
 108. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text. 
 109. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006). 
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‘when the patentee consistently mark[s] substantially all of its patented 
products’ with the statutory label.”110  If the items are not marked with 
the patent number, or the mark is removed by an upstream seller, and 
then “reintroduce[d] into the stream of commerce, [this action of 
removing the mark] effectively immuniz[es] all subsequent purchasers 
from . . . infringement damages.”111 
In the case of the downstream consumer who is unaware of the 
original copyright infringement by the defendant-musician, copyright 
law could embrace patent-law doctrines regarding end-user immunity 
and lack of notice.112  Just like the ignorant downstream user of 
infringing patented technology, the purchasers of infringing songs could 
be considered too far removed to be foreseeable defendants.113 
One must also question whether the mode of purchase should affect a 
consumer’s liability for copyright infringement.  As noted earlier, 
purchasing a physical embodiment—such as a CD or vinyl record—does 
not impose copyright-infringement liability on the consumer.114  To 
declare that this same activity—changed only by how the copyrighted 
work is fixed—now results in infringement seems grossly unjust.  
Instead, “fundamental notions of fairness and legal process”115 should 
dictate that the same rules apply to both brick-and-mortar transactions 
and online purchases of music. 
This unforeseen downstream-infringement liability could have 
serious ramifications—pursuing consumers who believe they are legally 
acquiring copies of songs could lead to unintended consequences 
regarding the downloading and purchasing habits of the public.  It could 
                                                          
 110. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-op., Inc., 457 F.3d 1269, 1276 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Sentry Prot. Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 918 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. When faced with similar circumstances, policies and concepts from one area of intellectual-
property law are often adopted by another.  See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–35 (1984) (borrowing the express language in the Patent Act regarding third 
party liability to similarly impose “liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have 
not themselves engaged in the infringing activity,” namely vicarious liability and contributory 
infringement). 
 113. Similarly, in negligence law, Mrs. Palsgraf was unable to obtain any relief after being 
injured on a train platform by an exploding package because she was an unforeseeable victim too far 
removed from the act of negligence to receive relief in the courts.  Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R., 248 
N.Y. 339, 346–47 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).  For a plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, “[t]he 
damages must be so connected with the negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate 
cause of the former.”  Id. at 351 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 114. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 115. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 212 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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push people toward illegal download sites—after all, why do the right 
thing and pay for a legal download if one can still be sued?  A consumer 
may think that if he could be held liable for infringement because of the 
conduct of a musician, he might as well just download songs for free in 
an unauthorized transaction and make it more difficult to get caught.  
After all, a transaction on iTunes is easier to trace—the website has the 
customer’s name, address, and credit card information.  For the illegal 
download, a plaintiff may face a more difficult—if not impossible—task 
of tracking down those individuals who use infringing peer-to-peer 
downloading software.116  “More than one computer may be placed 
under a single [Internet Protocol (IP) address].  Thus, it is possible that 
the [Internet Service Provider (ISP)] may not be able to identify with any 
specificity which of numerous users” who are attached to a specific IP 
address at the time of the unauthorized download is the one who 
allegedly infringed.117  Under such circumstances, providing the 
plaintiffs with “a long list of possible infringers would” impermissibly 
lead to a “fishing expedition.”118 
V. CONTEMPLATING SOLUTIONS 
As noted earlier, many reasons support protecting online purchasers 
from downstream liability when the downloaded song infringes a  
 
                                                          
 116. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 178 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting that 
when determining whether to grant a subpoena requesting the name, address, and other information 
attached to an IP address, “the Court must consider whether the information sought can be 
reasonably traced to a particular defendant”); Lemley & Reese, supra note 17, at 5 (“[T]he copyright 
owner would need to provide evidence showing that the particular IP address in question was, at the 
time in question, assigned to the person against whom the dispute is brought.”). 
 117. London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 178. 
 118. Id.  In Sony Music Entertainment Inc. v. Does 1–40, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York laid out a test for “evaluating subpoenas seeking identifying 
information from ISPs regarding subscribers who are parties to litigation.”  326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 
564–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  Factors to weigh in balancing 
the need for disclosure against First Amendment interests. . . . include: (1) a concrete 
showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm; (2) specificity of the discovery 
request; (3) the absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed information; (4) a 
central need for the subpoenaed information to advance the claim; and (5) the party’s 
expectation of privacy. 
Id. (citations omitted).  The district court designed the test to avoid a “fishing expedition” by 
plaintiffs.  London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 178; see also Boag, supra note 19, at 243–44 
(discussing the privacy issues involved in subpoenaing ISPs for personal information of possible 
defendants). 
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copyright.  While courts could provide such protection, Congress should 
amend the 1976 Act. 
A. Is This Something the Courts Can Resolve? 
Courts faced with consumer-infringement litigation may wish to 
borrow the downstream-infringement doctrine from patent law and, in 
this manner, limit consumer liability.119  It may be considered legislating 
from the bench for courts to decide that this is a non-infringing use and 
hold that the rights granted to copyright owners under the 1976 Act do 
not include this kind of downstream activity; indeed, the First Circuit has 
held that there was no such exception in the 1976 Act.120  The court 
noted that while Congress made express exceptions to infringement 
liability for solely personal and non-commercial use in the 1976 Act, it 
had not done so for music downloading.121 
As a second option, customers in a copyright-infringement action 
could rely on jury nullification122 and hope that juries simply refuse to 
impose liability for infringement under these circumstances.  It would be 
very risky, however, to rely on a jury’s taking such action. 
Third, a consumer who incurs infringement liability for downloading 
songs that she reasonably believed to be non-infringing may convince a 
judge that statutory damages violate constitutional due process or 
common law excessiveness.  The constitutional issue regarding 
excessiveness is unresolved.  Recently, in Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, the First Circuit reversed a lower court’s 
finding that a jury’s imposition of $675,000 in statutory damages for the 
downloading of thirty songs violated the defendant’s constitutional right 
against a jury award as “‘grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the 
conscience of the court, or so high that it would be a denial of justice to 
permit it to stand.’”123  The appellate court found that the constitutional 
                                                          
 119. See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 120. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, Nos. 10-1883, 10-1947, 10-2052, 2011 WL 
4133920, at *9–12 (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 2011). 
 121. Id. at *10. 
 122. Jury nullification can be defined as “render[ing] an acquittal . . . in disregard of the 
governing law and the weight of the evidence.”  Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, 
Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2003). 
 123. 2011 WL 4133920, at *19, 21 (quoting Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1197 (1st Cir. 
1995)).  For further reading regarding the constitutionality of copyright statutory damages, see Colin 
Morrissey, Note, Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant Constitutional Standard for Statutory 
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issue was decided prematurely,124 and that before considering “whether 
the award violated due process[,] . . . [t]he district court should first have 
considered the non-constitutional issue of remittitur, which may have 
obviated any constitutional due process issue.”125  The appellate court 
“reinstate[d] the jury’s award of damages”126 and remanded to the lower 
court “for consideration of defendant’s motion for common law 
remittitur based on excessiveness.”127  In our example, if a court upholds 
a judgment of damages against the defendant class, or Caliber accepts a 
remittitur, he would then have the task of collecting damages from the 
one million defendants.128 
B. Or Does This Require a Legislative Solution? 
Courts have repeatedly stated that despite a law’s harsh and 
unintended consequence, judges should refrain from legislating from the 
bench.129  Thus, beyond the reduced statutory damages provided for 
when “innocent infringement” has been proven to the satisfaction of the 
court, action by Congress may be the prudent way to provide protection 
for downstream consumers caught in this web. 
Any amendment to the 1976 Act that protects consumers in this 
manner should be carefully worded so as to only cover downloads of 
music for which there is a reasonable belief that the musical composition 
in the sound recording fixed in the phonorecord does not infringe on any 
other musical composition.  Three alternatives could achieve this.  The 
first creates an exemption to infringement; the second and third amend § 
504(c)(2) of the 1976 Act regarding statutory damages.  One alternative 
to the § 504 amendment gives the courts discretion to reduce damages 
                                                                                                                       
Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3059 (2010). 
 124. Tenenbaum, 2011 WL 4133920, at *21. 
 125. Id. at *19. 
 126. Id. at *25. 
 127. Id. The appellate court noted that “[i]f, on remand, the court allows any reduction through 
remittitur, then plaintiffs must be given the choice of a new trial or acceptance of remitter.”  Id. 
 128. As discussed earlier, it is unclear whether this collection method would be allowed.  See 
supra Part III.A. 
 129. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc. 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005) (“[I]t is up 
to Congress rather than the courts to fix [unintentional drafting gaps].”); United States v. Hopkins, 
427 U.S. 123, 125 (1976) (per curiam) (“‘[I]t is up to Congress to remedy this apparent harsh 
result . . . .  [T]he courts should refrain from legislating by judicial fiat.’”) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Keetz v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 205, 207 (1964) (per curiam), superseded by 
statute, Tucker Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. 91-350, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 449, as recognized by 
Slattery v. United States, 635  F.3d 1298, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)). 
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even further than the $200 minimum now allowed.  The other shifts the 
burden to the plaintiff to show “non-innocent” infringement by the 
consumer, and innocent infringement would again lead to discretionary 
damages. 
1. Legislatively Providing for Another Exception to Infringement 
Under the 1976 Act 
This first alternative exempts downstream consumers from 
infringement.  There are already several exceptions to the rights granted 
in § 106, including exceptions for fair use,130 transfer of a lawful copy,131 
and secondary transmissions.132  One could analogize the creation of a 
bright-line exception for consumer downloads to the exception end 
receivers of a program received through a secondary transmission under 
§ 111 of the 1976 Act—when watching a favorite television show, one 
assumes that the transmission was lawfully obtained by the cable or 
satellite company from the broadcaster.  In the situation outlined in this 
Article, the consumer has a good-faith belief that the download 
purchased from the online music store is an authorized phonorecord of 
the sound recording and underlying musical composition.  In the 
alternative, rather than completely exempting downstream consumers 
from liability, Congress could set the statutory damages for this situation 
to a nominal amount. 
Providing an exception to infringement for consumers would create a 
bright-line rule for removing this unintended form of infringement.  “In 
deciding whether to adopt a bright-line rule or a loose standard, the 
Supreme Court has considered who will need to apply the legal rule, and 
in what context.” 133  The Fifth Circuit has noted that: 
[W]hen lines are drawn sufficiently sharp in their definitional edges to 
be reasonable and predictable, such differing results are the inevitable 
result—indeed, decisions are the desired product. . . .  [B]y making 
results more predictable, [bright line rules] serve[] a normative  
 
                                                          
 130. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 131. Id. § 109. 
 132. Id. § 111. 
 133. Jesse Leigh Jenike-Godshalk, Note, Appealed Denials and Denied Appeals: Finding a 
Middle Ground in the Appellate Review of Denials of Summary Judgment Following a Full Trial on 
the Merits, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1595, 1620 (2010). 
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function.  [They] operate[] as a rule of law and allow[] a court to 
adjudicate rather than manage.134 
A bright-line rule “has the virtue of predictability with the vice of 
creating results in cases at its edge that are said to be ‘unjust’ or 
‘unfair.’”135  As a disadvantage, bright-line rules can lead to “seemingly 
perverse results.”136  For example, consumers caught up in the web of the 
two musicians involved in an infringement suit over a copyrighted song 
currently fall on the infringement side of a bright line, which turns them 
into unintended downstream infringers—this can be viewed as a perverse 
result of this bright line of strict liability.137  Another bright-line rule 
excepting this behavior from infringement liability may be the 
appropriate remedy. 
2. Amending the Statutory Damages Provision Under § 504 to Provide 
for Greater Judicial Discretion 
This second option amends the provision regarding statutory 
damages—specifically § 504(c)(2)138—to provide greater judicial 
discretion regarding remedies.  Congress could enact legislation 
providing for one of several alternatives.  Courts could (1) receive 
authority to absolve the defendant of any monetary liability; (2) retain 
the discretion to limit damages to a nominal amount; or (3) require only 
that the innocent infringer delete all copies of the infringing song file.  
Such discretion would provide consumers with some sense of relief and 
certainty that, should they face infringement claims, the court may 
reduce or eliminate any liability for monetary damages. 
                                                          
 134. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) 
(citing Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 396 (1978)). 
 135. Id.; see also Elizabeth Cosenza, Dura-tion: A New Paradigm for Construing the Statute of 
Limitations in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 724, 725 (2010) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court has an “interest in promoting judicial economy and certainty in the law 
through the application of a bright-line rule of liability” because it “eases the burden on the judiciary 
and offers predictive value to those who provide services to participants in the securities business”). 
 136. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029. 
 137. Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing E. 
Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 415 (S.D. N.Y. 2000)) (noting that 
copyright infringement is a tort of strict liability). 
 138. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) (“In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, 
and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her 
acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of 
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.”). 
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One must bear in mind, however, that “as is always the case when an 
issue is committed to judicial discretion, the judge’s decision must be 
supported by a circumstance that has relevance to the issue at hand.”139  
Justice Ginsberg has “observed that ‘unlimited jury [or judicial] 
discretion . . . may invite extreme results that jar one’s constitutional 
sensibilities.’”140  Thus, the downside to legislating greater judicial 
discretion regarding statutory damages is the possibility of extreme 
results unintended by Congress. 
In addition, “workability is a fundamental concern for any legal 
standard or test.”141  Any statutorily granted judicial discretionary 
allowance would need to be workable by the courts.  One of the 
difficulties of providing for greater judicial discretion “is that it often 
requires difficult factual inquiries and subjective policy judgments which 
are more appropriate for legislative, rather than judicial, 
determination.”142 
Also, a judge’s reduction of damages still requires a trip to the 
courthouse by the downstream consumer, and it may be easier to settle 
than to hope that a sympathetic judge hears the case.  Legal fees would 
accrue even if the defendant is successful, and a settlement may occur 
regardless.  Thus, providing for judicial discretion regarding damages 
may not eliminate the threat of potential collateral damage of deterring 
consumers from legally downloading new music. 
3. Amending the Statutory Damages Provision Under § 504 to Shift the 
Burden of Proof 
A third alternative would be for Congress to amend § 504 to shift the 
burden of proof regarding innocent infringement from defendant to 
plaintiff.  Currently, the onus is on the defendant to prove innocent 
infringement.143  In the case of a consumer downloading a song from a 
website that was authorized to sell the song from the defendant-musician, 
however, the burden could instead shift to the plaintiff to prove “non-
                                                          
 139. City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 196 n.8 (1995) (citing 
Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982)). 
 140. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 430 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)). 
 141. Jenike-Godshalk, supra note 133, at 1620.  Despite disadvantages, “a bright-line rule may 
be preferable. Even for trained legal professionals, some tests may be so complicated or unclear that 
they do not provide enough guidance or that they even become unworkable.”  Id. 
 142. Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D. Conn. 1977). 
 143. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
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innocent” infringement.  If Congress chose to enact one or several of the 
other alternatives discussed in Part V.B as well, then a plaintiff’s failure 
to meet his burden of proof could lead to either zero or negligible 
monetary damages. 
Shifting the burden of proof would mean that the plaintiff would 
have a higher overall hurdle to meet for downstream consumers who 
purchase infringing songs.144  This may parallel the initial burden placed 
on copyright owners proceeding with take-down requests under the 
DMCA.  In Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., the court found that in order 
for a copyright owner to proceed with a take-down notice under the 
DMCA, there must be “‘a good faith belief that use of the material in the 
manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its 
agent, or the law’ [and] the owner must evaluate whether the material 
makes fair use of the copyright.”145  Similarly, in order to collect more 
than nominal damages, the statute could require a plaintiff suing 
consumers for downloading an infringing song from an online music 
retailer to show that the consumer’s actions were not those of an 
“innocent infringer.”  The plaintiff-musician would still have a claim 
against the infringing musician for every downloaded song, as well as 
against the online music retailer, but both of these defendants have 
greater resources at their disposal and are more cognizant of the risks 
than the downstream consumer.  Additionally, the online music retailer 
and the infringing musician are in a better position to negotiate for the 
possibility of an infringement lawsuit by the copyright owner regarding 
the alleged infringement.146 
Both allowing for more judicial discretion in awarding damages and 
shifting the burden of “innocent infringement” to the plaintiff, however, 
could lead to forum shopping and inconsistent results in different 
jurisdictions.  Some jurisdictions may be more inclined to find in favor 
of consumer defendants and others less likely.  Our system of justice 
seeks to discourage forum shopping and avoids inequitable  
 
                                                          
 144. For a general discussion of this burden-shifting for a determination of non-fair use for 
effective DMCA notices, see Benjamin Wilson, Notice, Takedown, and the Good-Faith Standard: 
How to Protect Internet Users from Bad-Faith Removal of Web Content, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 613 (2010). 
 145. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v)). 
 146. For example, an online music retailer may decide to negotiate for an indemnification clause 
in its agreement with musicians who wish to sell songs on the website. 
LIEBESMAN FINAL 11/14/2011  8:09 PM 
30 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
 
administration of the law.147  This burden-shifting approach may resolve 
the issue, but could also result in undesired consequences. 
Of the options discussed above—both judicial and legislative—
which one is the recommended approach?  All have pros and cons 
associated with them.  As noted previously, leaving it to the courts to 
declare that consumers were not intended infringers or to sua sponte 
reduce damages below the statutory minimums are not prudent solutions.  
A court will not wish to disturb a jury’s finding.  Indeed, hoping for a 
solution in the courts could also lead to bullying by the copyright owner 
through the threat of a lawsuit—a consumer is more likely to settle with 
the copyright owner than defend the suit in court. 
Therefore, sensible courses of action include adding an exemption to 
infringement liability under § 501 of the 1976 Act or amending § 504 to 
reduce or eliminate liability for monetary damages. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While some musicians may pursue consumers for this form of 
infringement, many others may not.  Some artists see any use of their 
music by someone other than themselves as unacceptable,148 while others 
may choose to only seek remuneration from the infringing musician.  
Music downloading has become the dominant way to purchase songs, 
and with so many consumers who could be affected, inconsistent 
enforcement could have a profound and widespread effect that extends 
beyond copyright law.  Inconsistent enforcement against downstream 
consumer infringers could weaken our overall fidelity to the law.  In 
addition, if infringement suits are brought against defendants who 
believe they are lawfully downloading songs, consumers may see little 
difference—and less risk—in downloading a song legally versus 
illegally.149  Taken to an extreme, this seemingly absurd form of 
infringement litigation could erode some basic tenets of our society—
namely our respect for the rule of law. 
                                                          
 147. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965). 
 148. For example, Prince is notorious in his attempts to control any and all uses of his music.  
See Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.  “Prince [has] spoke[n] publicly about his efforts ‘to reclaim his 
art on the internet’ and threatened to sue several internet service providers for alleged infringement 
of his music copyrights.”  Id. (citing Mike Collett-White, Prince to Sue YouTube, eBay Over Music 
Use, REUTERS, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/14/us-prince-youtube-
idUSL1364328420070914?fepdtype=RSS&FeedName_InternetNews&rpc=22&sp=true). 
 149. See supra Part IV. 
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In his article, Changes in American Veneration for the Rule of Law, 
James Gibson posits that Americans firmly support the rule of law as 
crucial for an effective democracy.150  He notes that consistency is at the 
heart of this concept: 
Where power is arbitrary, personal, and unpredictable, the citizenry 
will not know how to behave; it will fear that any action could produce 
an unforeseen risk.  Essentially, the rule of law means: (1) that 
people . . . will be treated equally by the institutions administering the 
law—the courts, the police, and the civil service; and (2) that people 
and institutions can predict with reasonable certainty the consequences 
of their actions, at least as far as the state is concerned.151 
“But the rule of law is more than a set of institutions, a constitution, 
or a book of statutes.  Indeed, perhaps [its] most important 
manifestation . . . is its representation in a nation’s culture—the beliefs, 
expectations, values, and attitudes held by [a country’s citizens].”152  
Indeed, Gibson points to Professor Martin Krygier’s admonition that the 
rule of law holds manifest and fundamental importance based on “‘a 
widespread assumption within society that law matters and should 
matter.’”153  As a society, we abhor regimes in which arbitrary laws are 
created and administered at the whim of its leader with little or no 
constraint, such as Iraq when it was ruled by the late Saddam Hussein or 
the former Soviet Union under the control of the late Joseph Stalin. 
Lack of faith that the rule of law will be followed—by either a 
country’s government or its citizens—may erode confidence, discourage 
corporations from conducting business, and in the situation described in 
this Article, deter consumers from purchasing new musical compositions.  
If consumers no longer purchase legal downloads of new music154—
either foregoing any download or, in the alternative, downloading the 
song in an infringing manner—this could affect the business models of 
recording companies, purveyors of music scores, and retail stores.155  If 
                                                          
 150. 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 593, 593 (2007). 
 151. Id. at 596 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites 
of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 15 (1994)). 
 152. Id. at 598. 
 153. Id. (quoting Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of 
Communism, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 633, 646 (1990)). 
 154. New   compositions—and the sound recordings thereof—are most likely to be subjects of 
infringement suits.  Older songs have passed the “test of time” and are less likely to infringing. 
 155. See generally Daniel J. Wakin, Free Trove of Music Scores on Web Hits Sensitive 
Copyright Note, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011 at A1 (noting the effect of open-source websites offering 
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consumers choose to forgo any download, then new artists would be 
stifled in their ability to have their music proliferated among the masses, 
contrary to the purpose of the 1976 Act.156 
When contemplating the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress never 
intended to transform everyone who buys a best-selling song into an 
infringer because it is later discovered that the downloaded musical 
composition is infringing another.157  One should seriously question 
whether casting an infringement net around large masses of consumers 
who have made purchases in good faith is the kind of behavior society 
wishes to encourage. 
                                                                                                                       
music scores on traditional publishers). 
 156. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) (“The primary objective of the [1976] 
Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good 
of the public.”). 
 157. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
